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ABSTRACT 
The paper investigates into the inability of Italian architectural debate to produce sensible  
effects on the society – architects have not been involved in any task forces, nor have their  
proposals been taken in account for the norms for the post-pandemic. Our hypothesis is that 
the suggestions emerging from the debate are much vision-oriented, but are so weak from a 
strategic point of  view that they could even be seen as an example of bad strategy – as  
defined by Richard Rumelt. In the first part, through an extensive survey on various sources 
(e.g.,  interviews  and  video-messages  on  leading  newspapers,  social  media  and  TV 
broadcasts;  debates  on  architectural  journals  and  web  forums;  official  proposals  and 
manifestoes  by  professional  associations),  the  article  analyses  and  reframes  the  Italian 
architectural debate, for highlighting and defining its strategic weakness. The second part  
explains the main reasons for this weakness, showing that such inefficacy comes from the  
inability to deal with what Dan Hill  called dark matter,  i.e.  the network of organisations, 
culture,  bureaucracy  and  norms.  The  final  part  hints  at  a  different  perspective  on 
architectural design for better dealing with the dark matter,  thus giving the possibility of  
changing the generic proposals into strategic ones.
Keywords:  Architectural  Design,  Bad  Strategy,  Dark  Matter,  Italian  Debate,  Post-
Pandemic, Potential.
INTRODUCTION 
The  pandemic caused a  tremendous  shock.  Health  measures  aside,  the  attention  toward 
space – the right to live and use it– has leapt to an unprecedented level. Indeed, while sharing 
a  general  approach and wide-ranging statements  of  respect,  coordination and solidarity, 
European  Countries  have  applied  very  different  restrictions  and  confinement  measures 
(European  Commission,  2020).  Furthermore,  in  Italy,  the  Regions  can  set  rules  on  an 
individual base, generating inequalities that worsened the situation. Space was at the centre 
of  the  debate.  Only  after  some  silent  weeks,  the  world  of  architecture  reacted,  with 
proposals, debates, forums, interviews: thrilling new activism (Pierro & Scarpinato, 2020).  
As  the polemics  involved  all  types  of  space (e.  g.  the  value  of  public  space;  the  conflict  
between  private  space  and  remote-working  requirements;  the  difference  among  urban 
settlements and the countryside)  architects have made wide-ranging proposals,  trying to 
influence the government’s regulations and inspire future changes.
However,  despite  the  enthusiasm,  results  are  depressing  so  far.  The  task-forces  for  the 
emergency involve more than 800 people (Perrone, 2020), but no architects; and although 
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the government have already approved more than fifty decree-laws, directives and special 
measures  (Presidenza  del  Consiglio  dei  Ministri,  2020),  no  one  concerns architecture  or 
design, nor take into account architects’ suggestions. Thus, by surveying and reframing the 
debate  contributions,  the  article  aims  to  show  that  this  inability  of  producing  sensible 
consequences depends on the fact that those contributions are weak from a strategic point of  
view, or even, that they could be seen as an example of bad strategy – as defined by Richard 
Rumelt (2011).
The survey takes into account sources of three main types. Interviews, video-messages and 
letters authored by single (usually very famous) architects make the first one: often, these 
messages are reported many times in the leading newspapers, social media, webpages and 
TV broadcasts, thus gaining the broadest appeal. The second type includes the debates and 
forums  organised  either  by  leading  Italian  architectural  journals,  like  Il  Giornale 
dell’Architettura (hosting two main forums with no less than forty contributions by both 
academics and professionals) or by professional boards and associations, like the Order of  
Architects of Roma (OAR).  These contributions are usually  field-related and continuously 
nourish  the architectural  debate.  The official  proposals  and manifestoes made by formal 
organisations,  like  the  National  Order  of  Architects,  Urban  planners  and  Landscape 
Designers (CNAPPC) or the National Institute of Urban planning (INU), are the third source.
1. BAD STRATEGY 
Bad strategy tends to skip over pesky details such as problems. It ignores the power of  
choice and focus, trying instead to accommodate a multitude of conflicting demands and 
interests.  [Bad] strategy  covers  up its  failure to  guide by embracing  the language of  
broad goals, ambition, vision, and values. (Rumelt, 2011, p. 4)
Bad strategy can be seen as suggesting incoherent, or even impracticable strategic objectives  
using high-sounding words. Therefore, it is a result of a misconception of what strategy is 
which actually produces consequences – notably,  disadvantageous consequences. In other 
words, bad strategy “is not the same thing as no strategy or strategy that fails rather than 
succeeds.  Rather, it  is an identifiable way of thinking and writing about strategy” (p.  36).  
Rumelt  also  identifies  four  (quite  picturesquely  named)  hallmarks  that  characterise  bad 
strategy: fluff; failure to face the challenge; mistaking goals for strategy; and bad strategic  
objectives  (p.  32).  Although this  scheme does not  automatically  mark a  proposal  as  bad 
strategy, the hallmarks may be seen as symptoms of a bigger problem. Thus, it could work to 
reframe Italian architectural debate after the pandemic, and better understand its limited 
efficacy.
1.1. Fluff
Although the term fluff may be considered just a little bit too strong, it is fair to say that, too  
often, architects express their ideas through fascinating, but also ambiguous words and text.  
We  are  not  referring  to  the  properly  specific  terms  and  their  meaning,  the  so-called 
archispeak (Porter, 2004): “fluff masquerades as expertise […] and analysis” (Rumelt, 2011, 
p. 37), being consciously void of arguments and only aiming at gaining attention. Even if a  
right amount of fluff is ontologically connected to architects' attitude of producing poetics 
more than theories (Deregibus, 2016, p. 34), there is a well-detectable inclination toward  
fluff in Italian debate. Pierluigi Nicolin (1991) even defined ten styles used by architects for 
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presenting their project and ideas,  all  of which showed a variable degree of fluff,  lacking 
concreteness and aiming to charm the audience more than explaining something. During the 
pandemic, Kate Wagner (2020), coined the term coronagrifting, i.e. “using such a crisis for  
shameless self-promotion and the generation of clicks and income, while providing little to 
no  material  benefit"  –  a  definition  recalling  Gillespie’s  (2008)  greenwashing  one.  Quite 
curiously,  as one of the first devices against coronavirus – the so-called CURA (Connected  
Units  for  Respiratory  Ailments)  –  was  designed  by  the  Italian  architect  Carlo  Ratti,  
coronagrifting at the product scale is indeed quite limited in the Italian debate. Quite the  
opposite, at the architectural and urban scale, there are plenty of examples. 
Stefano Boeri just claimed his plan for Tirana (on which he has been working since 2015) to  
be the “first neighbourhood in Europe [...] able to respond to the new needs of the post-Covid 
19 pandemic phase” (Ravenscroft, 2020). Renzo Piano (2020) have envisioned that it will be 
critical “to build buildings able to live with the environment” – as sustainability was never  
conceived; or to enhance “the fragility,  the sensitivity of architecture as a new expressive  
frontier”, whatever this could mean. Massimiliano Fuksas has claimed that architects must 
build “more flexible spaces” – maybe a little bit too generic aim? – envisioning blocks of  
apartments  in  which levels  “may change anytime for  hosting smart-offices  or healthcare 
space”,  and  flats  are  like  “pleasant  refuges”  (Merlo,  2020)  –  just  like  architects  usually  
designed bad houses on purpose. The same absence of real contents can be detected in many 
claims about “future houses” being able to react to this emergency (Bertelli, 2020) – which,  
although  utopian,  would  be  as  desirable  as  useless,  as  the  next  emergency  will  be,  by  
definition, unexpected. In all these cases, proposals do not show any substantial contents:  
they  are  merely  moral  exhortations  aimed  at  presenting  architects  as  prophetic  and 
illuminated “builders of the future” (Piano, 2020). The same can be said about Fuksas’ and 
Boeri’s  suggestion  to  “come  back  to  villages  and  enjoy  smart-working”  (Varlese,  2020. 
Brunella, 2020), which totally ignores the main problem concerned with such hypothesis – 
the digital divide – or the gravest consequences of diffused remote-working on cities (OAR, 
2020a).  Such  proposals,  more  than  having  no  effect  (which  would  be  the  effect  of  “no 
strategy”)  reduce  to  fluffy  slogans  the  efforts  of  numerous  architects  and academics  for  
overcoming the separation between urban environment and the countryside (De Rossi  & 
Mascino, 2020), not by chance triggering quite upset replies (Bussone, 2020). Thus, even if  
the use of ethics and visions in a rhetorical way is, unfortunately, quite common (Deregibus,  
2016, p. 14), all these examples show an unprecedented degree of fluff. 
1.2. Failure To Face The Challenge
We  may  think  that  fluff  is  just  enough  for  reducing  most  proposals  to  self-promotion. 
Nevertheless, the limit between propaganda and ethics (Deregibus, 2016, p. 45) is all but 
easy to define. That is why the other hallmarks identified by Rumelt are so important. The 
“failure to face the challenge” directly derives by the misconceptions of the problem. For 
example,  in the case of  the CURA module,  the problem was carefully  limited,  and it  was  
possible to design a solution: defining the problem, as difficult to solve as it may be, allows to 
make  specific  proposals.  On  the  contrary,  most  of  the  suggestions  emerging  by  the 
architectural debate are generic precisely since they do not deal with “a” problem, whatever 
it may be. For example, one of the priorities proposed by INU is a Green New Deal, which “by 
decarbonizing  production  systems,  supporting  the  circular  economy,  and  pushing  urban 
renewal and sustainable tourism, aims to pursue the adaptation and the mitigation of risks 
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deriving from climate changes,  for healthier,  more sustainable and more equitable urban 
communities” (INU, 2020). However, while stressing the application of existing (and much-
ignored) plans is an embraceable call, its relation with the pandemic is quite indirect, not to 
say obscure. Thus, it becomes a moral call, more than a practical proposal. Similarly, various  
soft-mobility measures are being proposed to improve the quality of the city. However, while 
there  could  be a  relation  between  commuting rate  and the  pandemic (Musolino & Rizzi 
2020),  much less obvious is the specific advantage of soft mobility.  Possibly,  this unclear 
relation is  why,  even if  several  Italian cities  (Rome,  Bologna,  Turin,  Bari  and Milan) are 
among the twenty most enthusiast  cities in announcing permanent or temporary cycling  
measures, actually implemented actions are far less impressive (ECF, 2020). Small changes 
followed grandiose announcements, probably because these measures relied on (respectable 
and  shareable)  political  and  moral  reasons,  but  failed  in  facing  the  true  challenge.  By 
contrast,  just  a  few  lines  after,  there  is  a  clear  call  to  drastically  improve  broadband 
connection and the existing Plan for Digital Italy – aimed at improving broadband diffusion  
(Bonora & Vaccari, 2014). Even without proposing practical measures, this call at least faces 
a definite and recognized problem (UNCEM, 2020), thus entering the debate (or rather, the 
debate on how to do it or how much would it cost).
Misconceptions and biases can lead to similar failures. The CNAPPC (2020b) suggested that a  
priority  topic  should  be  the  adoption  of  “a  systemic  approach”.  Still,  it  refers  it  to  the  
traditional concept of  the city,  made by the centre and the outskirts – a pretty outdated 
vision. Just a few lines after, the same list invokes a quite obscure “system of strategies” for 
improving the relationship between the city and the territory, even if the challenge would be  
precisely the defining a comprehensive strategy based on the relation between them, more 
than putting aside two separate strategies. Another example is the compresence of claims to  
the  beauty  of  the  countryside  –  an  invitation  to  spread  people  far  from  the  city  –  and 
suggestions  for  proximity  cities  (Carta,  2020),  mainly  inspired  by  the  “Ville  du  quart  d 
‘heure” plan for Paris or the 20 Minute Neighbourhood Portland’s plan. Unfortunately, these 
examples  are  usually  interpreted  as  a  generic  closeness  between  houses  and  services,  
without further insights.
1.3. Mistaking Goals For Strategy
While strategic objectives “should address a specific process or accomplishment” (Rumelt, 
2011 p. 47), goals are the desired status in the future. In systems theory terms, this future of 
the present is ontologically different from the present of the future, i.e. the real state of things 
when the future will happen (Luhmann, 1996, p. 51). Here the difference between goals and 
strategic objectives originates: we may, and should, select a series of purposes, but then, the  
strategy for reaching those goals is a different thing. A clear example is the repeated misuse  
of  the  concept  of  resiliency.  Initially  defined  as  the  normal  development  under  difficult 
conditions, it gradually turned into a positive adaptation despite adversities (Luthar, 2006).  
Therefore, since it entered architectural debate (Pickett et al.,  2004), it was intended as a 
most  desirable  goal,  eventually  becoming the  11th  Sustainable  Development  Goal  in  the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: again,  a goal,  not a strategic objective.  But in 
Italian architectural debates, resiliency inspires more poetic vision and metaphors – being 
defined as “a more appropriate circular metabolism of all functions of the city” (Carta, 2020) 
– than practical suggestions on how to improve adaptation. In a 24-hours marathon called 
DIALOGARE24H, organised by CNAPPC (2020b), one of the main topics was “Italy as a net of  
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Resilient Cities”: the resulting claim was the invitation to “Promote the renewal of outskirts 
through  polycentric  socio-cultural-environmental  regeneration  projects,  integrated into  a 
widespread system of poles and centres, joined in a network”.  Not only this claim fails in 
defining any strategic action, but it is also outrageously obscure. The other topics (Global 
challenges; Sustainable dwelling; Urban and territorial renewal; Innovative virtuous models)  
produced similar statements, ending in a manifesto with little or no strategic outputs. 
Another example is the hope for a “happy city,  supplied with extraordinary as inevitable 
technologies, […] an “organism”, […] a network of all parts of the extended territory, where 
even the remotest places are like safe locations, and social cohesion is enhanced through the 
local  dimension” (Alvisi,  2020).  Even supposing that this statement was something more 
than fluff – as this polished phrase simply means that countryside should work as a refuge 
for citizens during emergencies – it shows a clear shift between the goal (the “happy city”) 
and the proposed strategy:  that is,  “to  redesign sections of  the city”.  An impossible task  
indeed due to the historical buildings and Italian cultural background – paradoxically, this 
resistance is a real example of urban resilience. The same strategic weakness can be detected 
in Stefano Boeri’s cathedratic enunciation for the “three top priority for Italian cities”, i.e. soft 
mobility,  forestation  and  energy  transition  (Pierotti,  2020):  unquestionably  essential 
objectives,  but  void of  any indications about  how to make  them real.  Thus,  again,  goals,  
presented as strategic without being as such.
1.4. Bad Strategic Objectives
The last hallmark of bad strategy is having “bad strategic objectives”,  that is,  in Rumelt’s 
colourful  style,  either  “dog’s  dinner”  or  “blue-sky”  ones:  both  highlight  the  true  reason 
behind bad strategic objectives, i.e. the inability of making choices and, consequently, actual  
proposals.
The first categories refer to the tendency of enumerating a (long) series of unconnected aims, 
without imposing a priority rate or relating them. The Order of Architects of Rome collected  
no  less  than  31  information  clips  (OAR,  2020b),  by  selecting  just  the  most  significant 
“strategies,  objective,  models  and  outlooks”:  obviously,  many  are  inconsistent  with  each 
other. Also suggestions for post-pandemic houses typically take the form of a dog’s dinner 
list – apparently showing that existing ones are uninhabitable. New homes should indeed:  
have at  least  50% of  the façade  covered in  green,  avoid 5g  and wireless  technology,  be 
supplied with water-saving devices (Pica Ciamarra, 2020); be less obstructive and limiting 
(Cucinella, 2020); offer new possibilities for living together, most likely on roofs (Musillo,  
2020); valorise balconies and terraces (Carpenzano, 2020); be bigger (Politini, 2020).  But 
achieving  these  goals  would  require  a  complete  revolution  in  regulating,  financing, 
commissioning, designing, producing, buying, and living houses: problematic for new ones, it 
is obviously impossible for the already the existing ones – and it’s worth noting that 75% of 
architectural market in Italy is about renovation, the highest rate in Europe (Mura et al., p.  
12).  The  result  is  that  the  market  actually  orients  housing  evolution  way  more  than 
architects and their smart, but vague suggestions.
Instead, blue-sky objectives are simply “restatements of the desired state of affairs” (Rumelt,  
2011, p.54). This is the case of the manifesto by the CNAPPC (2020b): strategic suggestions 
as  “following  the  17  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDG)”,  as  well  as  enhancing 
architectural  competition  as  opportunities,  simply  reiterate  a  hoped state  of  things  by  a 
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moral invocation, without suggesting any measure that could change the situation. While the  
17  SDG are  generically  present  in  most  debates,  rarely  they  actually  enter  architectural 
debate; and the limited use of open architectural competitions is a long-term problem in Italy 
(Bonfiglio et al., 2018). The same can be said about some of the suggestions made by INU 
(2020), like the indication of “improving soft mobility, railway, public transport, and street 
network” – that is, all existing communication routes. Or the invocation to “simpler processes 
and less bureaucracy”: a moral claim will change the situation which will not change this 
long-term  problem  –  it  has  been  said  that  in  Italy  there  is  a  sort  of  “Truman  Show  of  
normative simplification” (Basilica & Barazzoni,  2014,  p.  224).  An easy way for detecting 
blue-sky objective is noting that, not too surprisingly, quite all the keywords appearing in the  
proposals were already there before the pandemic: most suggestions simply revamp them, 
now just relying on the emergency state for holding a broader appeal with the general public.
2. WHY SO MUCH BAD STRATEGY?
This reframe shows an alarming strategic weakness of proposals emerging from the Italian  
architectural debate. Three are the main reasons for this lack of thoroughness. The first is the 
inability to understand the problem, the deep reasons behind it, and its possible outcomes 
(Rumelt,  2011, p. 77). In the case of the pandemic, most issues related to space (e.g.,  the 
difficulty in managing remote working in the homeplace; the problem of social distancing in 
public areas)  could have been foreseen,  but  architects  started to  speak about them only 
when they were evident – working on what Okashah and Goldwater (1994) called known 
knowns or known unknows, when the problem was an unknown unknown. The second is the 
conflict of interest. Many proposals are definitely aimed at getting commissions of some kind 
– like being hired as a consultant for urban renewal, smart-cities implementation or cities  
forestation – and self-promoting.  It  is  a different kind of coronagrifting,  indeed:  a rivalry 
resulting  from the outrageous  number of  Italian architects  (more than 150.000 out  of  a 
population of 60 million people) and their desperate search for visibility. The third reason is  
the “unwillingness or inability to choose” (Rumelt, 2011, p.59). All official statements report 
long lists of objectives, even conflicting ones. Way more useful would be to propose just a 
few actions, but very carefully chosen (Ivančić, 2014), but this choice would imply a proper 
strategic view.
Communication enhances these problems. Newspapers and TV broadcasts report only the 
most  famous  architects'  opinions  as  they  represented  all  architects  –  which  is  false. 
Webpages and social media usually report comments against these very same opinions, even 
if praised by the press. Forums, journals and reviews report soliloquies more than disputes, 
as the contributions show no reference to each other. Associations favour a (well-disguised) 
top-down  approach  trough  proposals  coming  from  restricted boards.  In  other  words, 
debates  are  amazingly  fragmented,  so  that  there  is  a  sensible  shift  between  the  actual 
proposals  and  the  perception  of  these  proposals.  Most  suggestions  seem  erratic  and 
unconvincing because, elsewhere, there are opposite or at least inconsistent ones.
The ultimate result of such weakness is that architects fail to significantly influence what Dan 
Hill (2012) calls “dark matter”, or the “amorphous, nebulous yet fundamental”, network of  
organisations,  culture,  bureaucracy  and  norms  (p.  81).  Excluded  from  the  task  forces, 
ignored in the writing of laws and decree-laws, architects at most inspire massive plans (e.g., 
soft mobility plan, green city plan), which, not too curiously, most often get lost in the maze  
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of procedures, like any long-term proposal which mistakes goals for strategy and scarcely 
cares  for  proximate actions.  It  could seem that  this ineffectiveness,  for  Italian architects,  
comes from social factors – either a loss of authority and credibility (Armando & Durbiano,  
2017) or the idea that architects have more aesthetical than practical skills (Abis & Airoldi,  
2018).  But reframing the debate shows that most proposals, while being imaginative and 
sometimes  operative,  do  not  have  any  capacity  to  influence  the  dark  matter:  thus,  the 
problem could  be a  lack  of  competence  in  changing wishful  thinking in  strategic  design 
actions. For example, even if the main debates were about how to live the public space, only a 
few architectural proposals actually proposed concrete actions for making it usable while  
ensuring  social  distancing  (Hitti,  2020).  Quite  all  similar  Italian  projects,  as  those 
reimagining  beaches  (Carillo,  2020;  Giannitielli,  2020),  failed  because  they  favoured  the 
conceptual  (demagogic)  dimension  over  the  dark  matter  –  for  example,  they  were  too 
complicated or expensive,  or  they were against rules  and regulations,  or  did  not take in 
account how people act  and live.  That is  revealing,  as so many international cases show 
possible solutions – think to Domino’s Park or High Line in New York, or Centrum Sztuki 
Galeria EL in Elblag, Poland, or, speaking about beaches, the smart solution adopted in La 
Grande-Motte, France.
3. WHY DO WE NEED ARCHITECTURE?
Few designers would see that their design challenge is to understand, and often reorient,  
[the net  of]  relationships.  […] Designers,  like  clients,  are themselves attracted to the 
shiny end of projects, rather than delving into the dark matter and settling in for the  
lengthy engagement with an organization. (Hill, 2012, p. 93)
Comparing the proposals made by architects with other suggestions, like those by the Order  
of the Engineers of Milano (2020), it is clear that the last ones are much more practical and  
dark-matter-oriented. Indeed, architects’ reactions to the pandemic seem more aimed at self-
promotion – or to the promotion of architecture itself, for the less famous architects – than at 
solving a problem or influence future changes.  In  other words,  proposals emerging from 
Italian architectural debate are certainly “vision-oriented”, but lack any strategic dimension,  
rarely dealing with the complexity and even proposing conflicting aims.  That is  probably 
why the dark matter has ignored them so far. Invocations for a law of (or for) architecture 
(CNAPPC, 2018. MAXXI, 2020) are understandable, also considering the severe job crisis of  
architecture in Italy (Mura et al., 2016). However, much stronger these invocations would be  
if  they  could  explain  why  exactly  Italy  do  “need  for  architecture”  (CNAPPC,  2020a)  as  
claimed by all architectural organisations – moral reasons aside. Indeed, the answer could be 
that architects can “spatialise strategies” (De Rossi & Deregibus, 2020), using the project for 
exploiting,  and orienting the potential  (Jullien,  2004,  p.  16)  of  dark  matter:  this  attitude  
would allow architects to deal with infrastructuring (Pipek and Wulf, 2009), working both on 
things and the relations between them (Larkin 2013) for designing all  along the process 
(Chia, 2014). This conceptual shift implies using the project as a tactical tool for shaping the 
process as long as architectures, influencing the dark matter as long as dealing with it (Star  
and Ruhleder, 1996).
The pandemic has highlighted several topics which would critically benefit of this kind of 
architectural  attitude.  For  example,  care  facilities  for  the  elderly,  almost  always  isolated 
buildings with no direct contact with the rest of the world, proved to be totally inadequate: 
instead of being preserved, they suffered a dramatic contagion rate (Noli, 2020). Instead of 
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nursing homes, probably it would have been better to have diffused residential facilities. An  
alternative  hindered  by  the  fact  the  most  houses  in  Italy  are  private,  and  rarely  people 
relocate: older people move to hospices only when they cannot avoid it. At the same time, 
remote-working is already shaping city’s  spaces,  both the way of using buildings and the 
ground floor of commercial activities: consequently, the availability and the values of spaces 
and buildings  will  change  a  lot,  while  new opportunities  for  the  smaller  town  will  rise.  
However,  as  the  so-called  “inner  areas”  (Tronca,  2020)  lack  facilities  and  service,  this  
transition risks being difficult. These three topics – house facilities, city’s space, inner areas –  
are close connected: and they all  concern spaces,  requiring architectural  projects able to 
infrastructure the dark matter, instead of decorating the places. 
Even so, architecture could play a role even at a smaller scale: epitomic is the case of the  
vaccination  campaign  facilities.  Clearly,  vaccinating  about  50million  people  require  an 
infrastructuring of some kind. Awkwardly, the architectural answer to this demand was the 
so-called Primrose Pavilion by Stefano Boeri (De Iuliis,  2020):  a useless,  purely symbolic 
project unable to fit the vast majority of the historical squares to which should be destined,  
for either its dimensions or its too pure form. Above all, cheaper, smarter, more flexible and 
practical  solutions  already  exist  (the  emergency  tents  used  for  earthquakes  or  similar 
disaster,  for  example).  So,  self-promotion  of  the  design  team aside,  the  project  just  has 
aroused polemics against its pointlessness: and, by extension, against the pointlessness of  
architecture tout court. Only the ability to influence and orient the dark matter will make it  
possible to evolve those generic, vague and unpractical proposals into strategic ones: and 
only then, architecture will become indispensable in Italy.
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